On the Relationship Between Mobility, Population Growth, and Capital Spending in the United States by Marco Bassetto & Leslie McGranahan
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOBILITY, POPULATION GROWTH, AND









We thank Gadi Barlevy and Mariacristina De Nardi for helpful suggestions and R. Andrew Butters
and Hao Zou for valuable research assistance. Marco Bassetto gratefully acknowledges the National
Science Foundation for support through grant 0754551. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Marco Bassetto and Leslie McGranahan. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.On the Relationship Between Mobility, Population Growth, and Capital Spending in the United
States
Marco Bassetto and Leslie McGranahan




In this paper, we investigate the relationship between public capital spending and population dynamics
at the state level. Empirically, we document two robust facts. First, states with faster population growth
do not spend more (per capita) to accommodate the needs of their growing population. Second, states
whose population is more likely to leave do tend to spend more per capita than states with low gross
emigration rates. To interpret these facts, we introduce an explicit, quantitative political-economy
model of government spending determination, where mobility and population growth generate departures
from Ricardian equivalence by shifting some of the costs and benefits of public projects to future residents.
The magnitude of the empirical response of capital spending to mobility is at the upper end of what
can be explained by the theory with a plausible calibration. In the model, more mobile voters favor
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The sharp recession recently experienced by the United States has highlighted once more the
plight of states whose nances are bound by constitutional restrictions on their indebtedness. The
gap between many states' revenue projections and their anticipated expenses calls into serious
question their ability to balance their books without substantial help from the federal government,
which is not bound by similar rules. Throughout the recession, the federal government has been
able to borrow large resources from the capital markets.
While almost all states are in principle prevented from borrowing to cover their ordinary
budget, most of them are permitted to issue bonds to pay for capital improvements. This rule,
commonly known as \the golden rule," has long been rationalized with the fact that capital
improvements benet generations to come, who should be called to share the burden.1 Current
expenditures presumably benet only the current generation who should therefore bear all the
costs. Of course, such a rationale only holds in an economy that is far from Ricardian equivalence,
for otherwise government debt would have no eects on allocations and welfare (Barro [4]).
In this paper, we look at the evidence that variation across states in capital spending is
driven by departures from Ricardian equivalence stemming from mobility and population growth
through the lens of a model that explicitly incorporates an interaction between dynamic economic
and political decisions.
To this end, we build a dynamic political-economy model, where voters choose the provision
of public goods anticipating that their future costs (and benets) will be shared with incomers
and will not be borne (and enjoyed) by a household once it emigrates. Our model builds on
Bassetto with Sargent [7], generalizing results to an environment with many states and time-
varying demographics, so that the parameters of the model can be directly matched to the
regression coecients from our state-level empirical analysis. More generally, our research ts
into a broader research agenda that studies the interaction of dynamic economic and political
decisions to understand scal policy and government debt; a few examples of this pursuit are
Klein, Krusell and R os-Rull [17], Azzimonti [1], Battaglini and Coate [8, 9, 10], Azzimonti,
1See e.g. Studensky [25].
1Battaglini and Coate [2], Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti [24], and Bachmann and Bai [3].
Our starting point is a simple environment where the population is spread across dier-
ent states, and voters choose public spending year by year, taking into account the exogenous
prospects for mobility that they face and an exogenous path for population growth in the state
they reside in.2 Voters discount future costs and benets of their policy choices more heavily
than eciency would dictate: this occurs because they neglect costs and benets that will accrue
to future residents of the state that are not yet present. This eect will be larger, the faster
a state's population is growing or the more turnover among residents. In the absence of any
restriction on government indebtedness we would thus expect states to run large decits. How-
ever, as mentioned above, the manifestation of the golden rule in the U.S. states prevents voters
from nancing non-capital expenses with debt. If strictly enforced, the golden rule fully restores
incentives to provide the correct amount of nondurable public goods: this is because both costs
and benets accrue immediately, and no long-term consequences emerge. However, in the case
of public capital, both benets (of current investment) and costs (of current debt issuance) spill
over into the future. These costs and benets could align if debt issuance were structured so
that the debt was paid o at the same time as the benets accrued, but in practice the two need
not be aligned correctly. In particular, whether costs or benets will be shifted further into the
future depends on many parameters, but especially on the duration of capital and the limits on
the maturity of debt and the fraction of debt nancing. The shorter the duration of capital, the
longer the maturity of debt, and the larger the fraction of debt nancing, the more costs are
shifted to the future relative to benets, to the point that voters might actually be induced to
overspend.
The degree by which cost/benet mismatches lead to inecient spending depends on how
far away the demographic structure is from Ricardian equivalence. At one extreme, in a world
of no mobility and no population growth, the set of voters would be xed and the distribution
2By assuming that the evolution of population is exogenous, we abstract from the capitalization eects that
play a very important role in the literature on urban economics. A recent survey of this research is in Ross
and Yinger [21]. By looking at state-level data rather than local data, we expect capitalization to be much less
prevalent.
2of costs and benets over time should be irrelevant. In the presence of mobility and population
growth, the model delivers quantitative predictions on how these population attributes aect
capital spending. It is these predictions that we take to the data.
In our empirical exercise we use state-level panel data to document two main facts:
1. For a given population growth rate, capital spending is positively related to mobility, i.e.,
it declines with the fraction of the population that remains in the state in any given year.
This implies that the capital stock increases with gross migration.
2. Capital spending by the states reacts to population growth less than would be needed to
preserve a constant capital stock per capita. This implies that the capital stock per capita
declines with population growth.
While mobility has sometimes appeared in previous empirical studies of state-level spending
(see Poterba [19]), to our knowledge we provide the rst systematic evidence that gross interstate
mobility is an important predictor of state-level spending, both using within- and across-state
variation. The predictive power of gross state mobility persists even after we control for other
measures of mobility, such as net interstate mobility or mobility within the state. This is en-
couraging for our model, where gross state mobility, as distinct from those alternative measures,
plays a central role.
Our main objective is to interpret the magnitudes of the coecients that we nd relative
to our model's sharp quantitative predictions about the degree of departure from Ricardian
equivalence. A positive relationship between mobility and capital spending is interpreted by
the model as evidence of too much borrowing: when future costs exceed the benets, a more
mobile population is more prone to overspending. The magnitude of the empirically measured
link between mobility and spending is economically important, and it is in fact at the upper end
of what the theoretical model can deliver.
In matching the second fact to the theory, accounting properly for implementation delays
is important. In a world in which public projects are completed within a period (a year) of
their approval, it would take implausibly large departures from Ricardian equivalence for public
investment to fall as much behind population growth as it does in our data. But in reality,
3gathering bids, signing contracts, and completing construction take more than a year. In the
presence of implementation delays, the model predicts a weaker link between capital spending and
population growth: in the short run, spending is predetermined and investment per capita may
respond negatively to population growth; in the longer run, a growth shock today will not fully
persist into the future, and implementation delays will then dampen the optimal response by the
voters. We are able to derive testable implications that are independent of the precise structure
of implementation lags: these are based on measuring the response of spending to distributed
lags of population growth (and mobility). These measures suggest that the relationships in the
data are not far from what the model would predict if states are adhering to the golden rule.
Our nal experiment estimates the fraction of debt nancing that would be needed in the
model to match the response of public investment to mobility and population growth in the
data. Although our overidentifying restrictions are often statistically rejected, the estimate for
public investment is close to 100%, the value that should arise if states abide by the golden rule.
Similar inference for current expenses suggests a small, but positive fraction of debt nancing;
this is what we would expect if there is a little margin to bend the golden rule.
In the remainder of the paper, section 2 presents the model through which we interpret the
data; it derives the equilibrium relationship between government spending, population growth,
and mobility, provides intuition on its nature, and discusses ways in which this relationship can be
informative about the parameters of the model. Section 3 describes the data and provides a brief
institutional overview. Our main results are presented in section 4, while section 5 speculates on
directions for future research.
2 Model
2.1 Primitives
The model we adopt is based on Bassetto with Sargent [7]. However, we explicitly introduce
here the sources of variation across states (jurisdictions) and over time that will form the basis
of our estimation procedure. While highly stylized, the model we present provides an explicit
4account of the forces that drive political decisions, and thus oers a transparent interpretation
of the ndings of our empirical exercise.
We consider N states (jurisdictions), each populated by a continuum of households. Each
state n is characterized by the following random variables:
 nst, the population growth in state s at time t.
 st, the probability that a household living in state s at t 1 is in the same state at t. For
simplicity, we assume that the probability of moving is independent of age; time variation
in mobility will thus aect all residents uniformly.3
 st, a measure of the household preference for public goods in the state;
We assume that all residents of a state share the same mobility and the same preferences
for (state-level) public goods.4 By assuming that these random variables depend on the state,
rather than the household, we make our analysis tractable, but our results would be robust to
the extent that moving costs are high.5







where cit is consumption of a private good by household i (residing in state s) and Gst is the per
capita level of a state-level public good.6
3As shown in Bassetto and Lepetyuk [6] (e.g., gure 1), variation by age is not as important, except for the
old that are far from being pivotal. For the same reason, we can safely abstract from the probability of death:
except for the old, this is much smaller than the probability of moving. Introducing a constant probability of
death would complicate our intermediate steps, but would not aect the nal expressions that we take to the
data.
4Upon moving, each household thus inherits a new mobility and preference parameter, based on its new state
of residence.
5For evidence of limited mobility across states, see Meyer[18] and Gelbach [13]. Kennan and Walker [16] also
estimate very high moving costs for the large majority of residents of a state, limiting the pool of potential movers.
A model of policy determination with endogenous mobility is developed in Bassetto [5].
6We assume that public goods are subject to congestion externalities. This seems appropriate for state-level
5Households discount the future at a rate . We assume that the probability that a household
that moves from one state to another will move back is negligible. Because of this, households
discount future benets from the public goods and future taxes in the state in which they reside
by st+1.
In each period, each person alive produces y units of output, which can be either consumed
as a private good7 or invested in the public good. The per capita level of the public good evolves




Gst 1 + st; (2)
where  is the depreciation rate of the public good and st is public spending per capita in period
t in state s. In our empirical specications, we will consider several public goods, characterized
by dierent degrees of durability; in particular, we will constrast current expenditures (for which
we assume  = 1) to capital expenditures. The analysis developed here immediately generalizes
to multiple public goods by assuming that each good enters additively in the utility function.8
In particular, our key equations (7) and (9) will hold for each good independently.
Each state has a government that is empowered to levy income taxes and produce public
goods.9
The government faces a budget constraint, that links the evolution of its debt per capita Bst
to the decit it runs in every period:
Bst = (1 + rt)
Bst 1
1 + nst
+ st   Tst; (3)
where rt is the real interest rate, and Tst are tax revenues per capita.
public goods, since it is doubtful that the relative magnitude of Delaware vs. California is a major driver of public
amenities in the two states. Supporting this view, our population-based measure of state size is not signicant in
our regressions.
7The private good is nondurable. Private capital could be introduced with no eect on the results, if income
taxes are restricted to labor; see Bassetto with Sargent [7].







9Given that all residents of a state are identical and that location and income are exogenous, income taxes are
equivalent to xed lump-sum payments.
6Taxes and spending are chosen by majority vote each period by the residents of the state,10
subject to two borrowing restrictions. The rst restriction limits to a value x the fraction of
public spending that can be nanced with debt. The constitutions of most U.S. states prevent
borrowing, except to nance capital expenditures; this would correspond to x = 0 for current
(nondurable) expenses, and x = 1 for capital projects.11 We will both study the implications of
setting x to these values and make inference on x from the data. The second restriction limits
the duration of debt. In the model, this is represented by a parameter , which represents the
minimal fraction of outstanding debt that must be retired in any given period. This parameter
is a parsimonious representation of the limited duration of debt issued by U.S. states; for some
states, this limit is imposed by their constitution, while in other cases it might be driven by other
forces that are outside of the model, such as the lack of liquidity of maturities longer than 30
years. The two borrowing restrictions give rise to the following lower bound on taxes, given by
the fraction of spending that cannot be nanced with debt, plus the minimum debt repayment:




Given household preferences, the equilibrium interest rate of the economy is the constant rt =
(1   )=.
2.2 Equilibrium
Details of the denition and characterization of an equilibrium are provided in the appendix. In
brief, voters equate the marginal benet of an additional unit of investment with its cost, taking
into account the discounted value of future benet and cost changes that are triggered by today's
vote. We focus on Markov equilibria, where the equilibrium level of public capital is independent
of the past. In these equilibria, any additional investment in public goods beyond the equilibrium
10Given our assumptions, all residents will share the same preferences, and the vote will be unanimous.
11Pension obligations are an important grey area in the states' and localities' budgets, as witnessed by the
recent experience of states that have borrowed to fund these obligations. Funding pensions with debt violates
the golden rule by transferring the costs of current employees to future taxpayers. Inman [14] shows evidence of
strategic manipulation along these lines.
7level would only last for one period, and will be reversed in the subsequent period. This implies
that the marginal benet of a new project is equal to its marginal benet in one period, which
is stG
 
st . While the level of the public good is altered for only one period, the tax implications
stretch into the future. On the cost side, equations (3) and (4) imply that an additional unit of
Gst increases time-t taxes in state s by 1   x units.12 In period t + 1, in accordance with the
equilibrium, spending in the public good is reduced by (1 )=(1+nst+1) units to restore capital
to the level that would have prevailed without the additional spending in period t. Period-t + 1
taxes respond to this investment reduction by (1   x)(1   )=(1 + nst+1). Period-t + 1 taxes
are also aected by the additional debt (x) issued in period t. Of this debt, the state must pay
interest (at a rate (1  )=) and a fraction  of principal. The combined eect for period t+1
is thus given by
 











An additional unit of spending in period t has no further eects on public spending beyond
period t + 1, but the consequences of debt from the changes in spending in both periods t and











[   ](1   )
j 2; j > 1:
Whether taxes increase or decrease after period t + 1 depends on whether the public good
depreciates faster or slower than the rate at which government debt is paid back. When the
public good is not very durable and debt is paid back slowly, we have  >  and taxes increase
in the long run.
To a resident of the state at time t, the expected present value of taxes per unit of public
investment, Qst, is the discounted sum of all these present and future tax changes:
Qst Et

































12It is straightforward to show that voters will always choose to postpone taxes as much as possible, i.e., they
will choose taxes so as to make (4) bind.
8where Et is the conditional expectation taken with respect to the statewide shocks.
In voting, a resident will equate the marginal utility of the additional public good provision in




st = Qst =) logGst =
1

(logst   logQst) (6)
This expression conrms that voters choose a level of public capital that is independent of
past choices (if they expect future voters to do the same), thereby validating the nature of the
equilibrium that we conjectured.
2.3 Equilibrium Approximation: Capital
To simplify our expressions, we linearize logQst around nst = 0 and st = 1, and assume that
population growth and (one minus) the mobility rate follow AR(1) processes with autocorrela-
tions n and  and long-term means  n and  . This yields the following expression for the present
value of taxes per unit of investment that the current voters are expecting to pay:
logQst  log(1   (1   )) +
1 +  n    
1   (1   )

(1   )   x
1   (1   )
1   (1   )

+
n(nst    n)
1   (1   )

(1   )   x
1   n(1   )
1   n(1   )

 
(st    )
1   (1   )

(1   )   x
1   (1   )
1   (1   )

(7)
To derive intuition, we consider three components of equation (7) in turn:
1. log(1   (1   )). This is the only term that would apply if nst   n = 0 and st    = 1.
With no population growth and no mobility ever, this is a standard representative-agent
economy where Ricardian equivalence holds. Consequently, neither the fraction of debt
nancing x not debt maturity  have any eect on public good provision. Furthermore,
it is straightforward to verify that the representative agent votes for the ecient level of
Gst.13
13See the appendix for the derivation of the ecient level.
92. A term that captures the deviations from eciency that arise when n and  are zero:
1 +  n    
1   (1   )

(1   )   x
1   (1   )
1   (1   )

: (8)
In this case, the expectations about future mobility and growth are equal to their uncon-
ditional values  n and  . When x = 0 (there is no debt issuance), higher mobility (1   )
and/or population growth (n) between period t and period t + 1 imply a higher eective
discount factor by the voters. As a result, costs to current voters go up, and this leads
to an accordingly lower level of government investment (provided depreciation is less than
full, i.e.,  < 1). When debt issuance is allowed at the margin (x > 0), costs in the form of
debt repayment are also shifted into the future, reducing the ineciency caused by mobility
and population growth. The degree to which borrowing is eective at restoring eciency
depends on the relationship between  and :  measures the decay of capital (and hence
the rate at which benets shrink) into the future, whereas  measures the speed of debt
repayment (and hence the rate at which costs shrink). The higher  (the lower ), the less
debt is needed to restore eciency. When x goes above
(1 )(1 (1 ))
1 (1 ) , the term in brack-
ets is negative, and costs are shifted further into the future than benets, and deviations
from Ricardian equivalence imply overspending.
This logic is also helpful in understanding the case in which   n  1. In this case,
deviations from eciency (derived from both this term and the remaining terms in equation
(7)) are given by
1 + nst   st
1   (1   )

(1   )   x
1   (1   )
1   (1   )

;
which is equal to the term (8) simply replacing the unconditional means  n and   with the
current values of the shocks nst and st, which are perceived as permanent shocks for the
future.
3. The remaining terms in equation (7) capture the way in which the speed of the repayment
schedule interacts with the demographic processes as nst and st converge (in expectation)
back to their long-run steady states. When n and  are less than 1, the interaction
between these terms and the one in equation (8) is less straightforward and the level of
10debt that restores eciency will result from canceling out of the three terms where x
appears. In practice, our estimates of n and  are both close to one, so that the three
levels of debt that cancel out each of the bracketed terms in equation (7) will be very
similar, and the average will be close to
(1 )(1 (1 ))
1 (1 ) .
Based on the intuition developed above, the model predicts that the stock of public capital
will be lower in states with more population growth and/or higher mobility if no borrowing is
allowed. When enough borrowing of suciently long maturity is allowed, this relation reverses,
and more population growth (mobility) is associated with higher capital. This is more likely to
happen for capital that depreciates faster.
To gain further insight, in gures 1 and 2 we plot the log of the stock of the public good as a
function of the fraction of households that stay within the state from one year to the next (\the
stayers") and the degree to which debt nancing is allowed.14 In both gures we set  = 0:96,
 = 0:2, and  so that the half-life of debt is 15 years; we set population growth to 0 (to isolate
the eects of mobility), we assume constant mobility, and no implementation lags. Finally, we
also assume constant preferences, and we normalize st so that the ecient provision of the
public good (in logs) is 0.
In gure 1 we set  = 0:03, which may be appropriate for major infrastructure investment,
whereas gure 2 adopts  = 0:06, in line with many estimates of the depreciation of private
capital.
Not surprisingly, gures 1 and 2 show that Ricardian equivalence holds if there is no mobility
( = 1), while spending departs more and more from the ecient level when the fraction of stayers
decreases. More interestingly, the sign of this departure depends on the circumstances. Under
a pure balanced budget (x = 0), we unambiguously obtain that public capital is underprovided.
However, under 100% debt nancing, when capital is not very durable ( = 0:06) costs are shifted
into the future (relative to benets) to an extent that makes it worthwhile for voters to actually
overprovide public capital. In this case, increasing mobility (decreasing the fraction of stayers)
increases the provision of public capital. The main implication observed in these gures is that,
14The eects of population growth are analogous to those of mobility, so we do not plot them here.
11for high degrees of debt nancing, we should observe a positive relationship between the level
of public capital and mobility for capital goods subject to rapid depreciation, and a negative
relationship for very long-term projects.
2.4 Equilibrium Approximation: Identication of Factors Aecting
Investment
The discussion above refers to the stock of public capital and assumes that projects are im-
plemented as soon as they are approved. In the data, we actually observe the ows of public
investment (and expenses in nondurable goods); moreover implementation lags are likely as bid-
ding and contracting may wait until after voter or legislature approval and projects may take
several years to complete. We adjust for both of these before we take our model to the data.
In the model, the investment ow is captured by the variable st, which can be easily computed
from (2) and (6). We account for implementation delays by assuming that capital projects are
approved by voters k years before they are implemented. Voters take into account the resulting
shift of both costs and benets into the future.15
15In our analysis, both benets and costs are subject to the same delay. We are mostly concerned with delays
arising from planning and bidding, periods in which little actual spending occurs.
12We generate the following expression for investment:16




Et k log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 (st k   st k 1)(1   (1   ))





















This equation shows how the parameters of the model aect the relationship between public
investment, population growth, and mobility. Our empirical strategy is based on testing the
model by running the corresponding regression:






bjs;t j + st; (10)
Interpreting the individual coecients in the sums in (10) is dicult because the corresponding
coecients in (9) are very sensitive to implementation lags. As an example, using our baseline
parameters of Table 1, we would expect b0  17 if there are no implementation lags, while
b0 =  1 with implementation lags of a year or longer. The intuition is straightforward: in the
rst case, investment ramps up immediately with population growth, to accommodate the needs
of the additional population; in the second case, total investment is predetermined by the voters'
previous decisions, so it actually falls in per capita terms if population grows faster, only to
increase at a later date.
Fortunately, the dependence of individual coecients on implementation lags can be over-
come by aggregating distributed lags. These sums correspond to dynamic patterns of change in
16See the appendix for its derivation.
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(1   (1   ))

(1   )   x
1   (1   )
1   (1   )

; (13)
where J > k is any number greater than the number of years of delay in implementation.
Bn corresponds to the change in investment in response to a shock in the growth rate of
population of magnitude  J
n in period t J that decays at the rate n through period t (attaining
a magnitude of 1 in period t). B has the same interpretation for a mobility shock. B
 corresponds
to the change in investment when the fraction of stayers increases by the same amount in periods
t   J through t.
Equations (11) and (12) are appealing in that they do not depend at all on the specic value
k. However, inference based on these coecients relies heavily on the interaction between the
persistence of mobility and population growth and the depreciation of capital. The simple sum
in (13) is much easier to interpret, and will not be very sensitive to k when  is close to one, as
we estimate in the data.17
To gain further intuition, consider rst what happens under ecient provision of the public
good. The ecient level is given by
stG
 
st = 1   (1   ):
17It might be surprising that the two sums given by (12) and (13), which are quite similar for   1, might
have signicantly dierent interpretations from the perspective of the model. The explanation for this apparent
puzzle can be seen from equation (9). For the typical values of the depreciation rate and the discount factor,
these expressions imply a very large coecient in the dierence between st k and st k 1. Hence, even small
changes in  may have a signicant impact on the overall sum. In the data, the high degree of autocorrelation
in st implies that measuring the eect of the dierence in mobility rates from one period to the next is dicult.
The straight sum in (13) bypasses this diculty.











1   (1   )
1=
: (14)
The ecient level of investment is driven by the total population of the state, independently of
the gross migration ows. For this reason, st plays no role in equation (14), and our estimates
of B and B
 would thus be zero. When a state's population is growing, equation (14) shows
that additional investment is needed to provide a constant capital stock per capita. After taking
logs and the appropriate linearization, the resulting coecient Bn would be equal to (1   )=,
which is the rst term in (11).
When B and B
 are dierent from zero, we can infer from their sign whether mobility is a
force that generates underprovision or overprovision of public capital in the model. Take B
 rst,
since it is the easier term to interpret. When no borrowing is allowed (x = 0), underprovision of
public capital occurs, and this is more severe the lower st is, since a lower probability of staying
magnies departures from Ricardian equivalence. As can be seen from (13), this is reected in
B
 > 0. As x increases, B
 decreases, until it eventually becomes negative when mobility starts
being a factor that generates overprovision of public capital.
The coecient B embeds a level eect, that is identical to the one described for B
, and a
time-trend eect. The trend eect works in the opposite direction of the level eect. Consider
the case of underprovision (say, x = 0). B measures the response to a shock that increased
st 1 by 
 1
 , and decayed to an increase by 1 in st. This shock implies an increase in the
desired level of capital that is greatest in period t   1. As of period t, the desired level of
capital is still higher than without the shock, but the decay implies that it is lower than period
t   1. Investment reects this desire for drawing down the stock. When depreciation is low,
undepreciated capital from the previous period is suciently high that drawing down the stock
requires curtailing investment in period t, and the overall eect of the shock on investment can
be negative in that period (even though st is higher than it would have been in the absence
of the shock). In contrast, when depreciation is high, not much of the additional capital from
period t   1 remains, and investment needs to remain elevated to deliver the higher period-t
capital stock that is warranted in consequence of the lingering positive shock to the fraction of
15stayers. We thus conclude that, for goods that are not too durable, underprovision is associated
with B > 0, whereas the reverse is true when  < 1   .
The intuition for Bn is completely analogous to the one about B, except that the \neutral"
value of this coecient is (1   )=, due to the need to provide additional capital when the
population grows faster. To discuss one of the cases, when x = 0 more population growth leads
to more underprovision of the public good. If  > 1   n, this level eect dominates, and the
response to population growth is smaller than (1   )=, the level that is necessary to preserve
the stock of capital per capita. If  < 1   n, then the trend eect dominates the level eect,
and underprovision is associated with Bn > (1   )=.
We illustrate the working of the coecients further by looking at their values under our
baseline calibration, presented in Table 1, and exploring their sensitivity to various parameters.
At the parameter values of Table 1 we obtain the following values:




 rst. Our calibration implies that the benets of capital goods are more weighted
towards the present than the taxes needed to pay o the debt. This implies that 100% debt
nancing generates incentives for overprovision of capital (i.e., the term in brackets in (13) is
negative).18 This incentive is lower, the closer we are to Ricardian equivalence and thus the
higher the fraction of the population that stays within the state from one year to the next. B

captures this eect, and the model predicts a negative coecient.
In the case of B, the point estimate for 1       turns out to be very close to 0, so that
the level and time-trend eects cancel out almost exactly. We thus expect this coecient to be
close to 0, and not very informative of over/underprovision of public capital.
For Bn, the condence interval for n still spans 1   , but a greater part lies in the range
for which 1      n > 0. In this range, the time-trend eect dominates the level eect. Hence,
when x is such that public capital is overprovided (i.e., when the term inside brackets in (11) is
negative), public investment responds less to population growth than it would if it simply kept
18The marginal debt nancing that would make mobility a neutral force on the stock of public capital is about
81%.
16up with providing infrastructure for the newcomers: Bn < (1   )=  15:7.19
Figure 3 shows how our coecients of interest depend on the fraction of debt nancing. B
and B
 cross the neutral level of 0 at 81% debt nancing. The response of B to changes in x
is more muted, since 1       is close to zero. For values of  < 1   , B would become
increasing in x. Bn crosses its neutral level of 15.7 at 84% debt nancing. Since  < 1   n, the
time-trend eect dominates, and Bn is decreasing in x (i.e., overprovision is associated with a
coecient that is below the neutral level (1   )=).
Figure 4 illustrates the role of the elasticity of the demand for the public good ( 1). For
small values of the elasticity, the provision of the public good does not respond much to the price
as perceived by the voters, and the coecients remain close to their neutral values, and far from
those that we will estimate empirically. We choose  at the lower bound of the existing estimates
to allow public good provision to respond in a meaningful way to our variables of interest.
Figure 5 displays the relationship between our coecients of interest and the depreciation of
public capital. In the case of the simple sum B
, this relationship is straightforward. For low
depreciation rates, x = 1 leads to underprovision, and B
 > 0. As  increases, B
 crosses zero
and becomes more and more negative: for goods that are less and less durable, the benets are
more and more skewed towards the short run relative to the costs, and greater overprovision
occurs. For Bn and B, the relationship is more complex: over/underprovision interacts with
the time trend/level eect. At very low depreciation rates, public capital is underprovided, and
the time-trend eect dominates: hence Bn > (1   )= and B < 0. At high depreciation rates,
public capital is overprovided, but the level eect dominates the trend eect, so Bn and B turn
around and once again we have Bn > (1   )= and B < 0. This is why it is more dicult to
rely on these measures to establish over/underprovision.
Finally, gure 6 shows how B and B
 are aected by the autocorrelation . In the case
of the simple sum B
, this autocorrelation matters because it governs the rate at which future
costs and benets decay. A low autocorrelation implies that mobility reverts quickly, and voters
19Since n 6= , the marginal debt nancing that would make population growth a neutral force on the stock
of public capital is not the same as that that would neutralize population growth. However, it is very similar, at
about 84%.
17respond less to its current deviations from the long-term mean, which means that B
 is closer
to 0. In the case of the discounted sum, this interacts with the time-trend eect, that becomes
dominant at low levels of correlation and thus implies B > 0 even though our parameter values
are such that public capital is overprovided.
3 Data and Institutional Features of the States
The assumptions in the model correspond to many of the basic features of state government
nance in the United States. Nearly all states operate under the strictures of balanced budget
requirements. These mandate that, at some point in the budgeting process, current expenditures
are expected to be paid out of current revenues. States dier in when in the budget process
balance must be obtained. As a result, these can dier in how binding they are in practice.
For example, the Illinois constitution states, \The Governor shall prepare and submit to the
General Assembly... a State budget for the ensuing scal year....Proposed expenditures shall not
exceed funds estimated to be available for the scal year as shown in the budget." In Illinois, the
legislature is also required to pass a balanced budget. However, if circumstances change within
the scal year, the state can borrow to cover unexpected decits.
Borrowing for capital expenditures lays outside these balanced budget requirements and sep-
arate provisions cover state ability to issue debt for capital projects. In Illinois, for example,
the state can issue debt provided that it is for a specic purpose and is approved by 3/5 of the
legislature or by a majority of voters in a referendum. Nearly all states also have capital budgets
that specically detail how capital projects are to be nanced.
For most municipal bonds, the state issues debt of a certain duration, gets the money up
front, spends the money within 2-5 years of issuance, pays interest over time (usually semi-
annually) and then pays the entire principal back when the bond matures. Most municipal
bonds are callable and most states allow bonds to be called and refunded provided that the
duration is not extended. Municipal bonds tend to be of fairly long duration. In January 2011,
the average maturity of municipal bonds was 15.6 years, while the average maturity of corporate
18bonds was 11.2 years.20 Also in contrast to corporate bonds, one municipal bonds issuance often
contains several maturities (these are called serial maturities). In addition, there are sinking
funds associated with non-serial bonds where the issuer makes several payments into a sinking
fund so that the entire principal does not need to be funded at one point.21
In order to estimate our model, our rst need is to measure the ow variable st for current
and capital spending. For this purpose, we use data from the Annual Survey of State Government
Finances. This data has been collected for all states by the Census Bureau since 1915 with the
omission of some years in the 20s and 30s. Since 1952, the survey has followed a fairly consistent
format. The data contain detailed information on government expenditures, revenues, and debt.
State government expenditures are divided into 64 dierent government functions, such as Air
Transportation, Corrections, and Elementary and Secondary Education. For each function, ex-
penditure data is available for numerous dierent purposes such as capital expenditures, current
expenditures, and intergovernmental expenditure.
In this paper we are concerned with patterns of current and capital expenditures. According
to the survey's classication manual, current expenditures include expenditures for employee
compensation, supplies and materials. By contrast, capital outlay includes \expenditure for
purchase or construction, by contract or government employee, construction of buildings and
other improvements; for purchase of land, equipment, and existing structures; and for payments
on capital leases.22" In the data, capital outlay is further divided into construction, purchase
of land and existing structures, and purchase of equipment. We also separately measure non-
highway capital spending and non-highway construction spending, since Poterba [19] argues that
highway spending is heavily inuenced by federal transfers.
We supplement this with data on state population growth and state mobility. State pop-
ulation data is available annually from the Census Bureau. It is straightforward to calculate
20See [22, 23].
21Our discussion here refers primarily to general obligation bonds, i.e., bonds that are guaranteed by the taxing
power of the state. These bonds t our theory better than revenue bonds, where the debt is repaid from revenues
generated by the project; in this case, the state is essentially providing a private capital good. See Johnson and
Rubin [15].
22See [26], chapter 5.
19population growth rates, nst, from this data.
The measure of mobility delineated in the theory is the probability that a household living
in state s at t is alive and in the same state at t+1. As mentioned earlier, we extrapolate away
from death by assuming a constant hazard of death. Data on annual state to state migration are
available from the IRS for 1975 to 2007.23 The IRS delineates a person as mobile if the address
provided on their return one year is dierent from the address provided on their return the
following year. We dene a state's gross emigration rate as the number of people who provided
an in-state address on last year's tax return and who provide an address in a dierent state this
year, divided by the number of people who provided an in state address last year and still live
in the US. The fraction of stayers is then one minus the gross emigration rate. We base this
measure of stayers on the number of people who have stayed in state rather than the number
of tax units that have stayed in state using information on the number of personal exemptions
claimed. The IRS data does not include information on the mobility of individuals who do not
le, or those who le after late September. We choose to use this data because it measures
annual mobility as is suggested by the theory, is available since 1975 so provides us with a long
time series, and is based on large enough samples to provide accurate measures of mobility for
the smaller states.24
We can only consistently estimate B
, B, and Bn if the preference shock captured in st
is orthogonal to population growth and immobility. As a result, we include in the regression
features of states that we believe are correlated with spending and may be also correlated with
either mobility or population growth. In particular we are concerned with proxying for state res-
ident preferences for scal variables that may also be related to population growth or mobility.
We choose several population attributes { average personal income, fraction of the population
with a high-school diploma, fraction urban, population density, fraction over 65, fraction under
23We thank Alicia Sasser Modestino at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for sharing this data with us.
24We also estimate our model based on ve year migratory ows available in the Decennial Census. We
interpolate between Census Years, adjust the estimates to account for the ve year window, and forecast ows
for years since the 2000 Census. We provide an estimate based on this alternative data in the appendix. The two
measures are very highly correlated.
2025, homeownership rate,25 state size, population liberalism, and resident taste for mobility. Most
of these variables are available annually or by decade from the Census Bureau. We interpolate
between Census years for data that is not available yearly. Three measures merit further dis-
cussion { state size, population liberalism and resident taste for mobility. We measure a state's
size in a given year as the fraction of U.S. population that lives in the state in that year. For
population liberalism, we use factor analysis; specically, we take the rst factor from ve state
political variables { the percent of the popular vote for the Democratic Presidential candidate
in the previous election, the percent of the state's Senate delegation that belongs to the Demo-
cratic Party, the percent of the state's House delegation that belongs to the Democratic party,
the average Americans for Democratic Action (ADA; a liberal political organization) score for
the state's Senate delegation, and the average ADA score for the state's House delegation. The
resident taste for mobility is measured as the number of people that moved to a new house in
the same state in the ve years leading up to the Census divided by the number of people that
stayed in state. We add this proxy for preferences for mobility because we believe that many
unobservable attributes of populations that would inuence interstate mobility would inuence
within-state mobility in a similar manner.26
Variable means and our abbreviations for these variables are presented in Table 2. We can
see from this table that states vary substantially in per capita scal variables. We also note
that state current spending is about 8 times the level of state capital spending on average. Most
capital spending is for construction while smaller amounts are dedicated to land and equipment
expenditure.
4 Estimation
To assess the success and the shortcomings of the model in explaining the data, we proceed in
two steps. First, we completely parameterize the model imposing plausible values into equation
25The homeownership rate is dened as the fraction of houses that are owner-occupied.
26State size would be an important exception, which is why we included it as an explicit control. Results are
similar with or without introducing state size.
21(9), and we study the dimensions in which the results diverge from the data. These parameter
values are summarized in Table 1. Second, we give the model one degree of freedom and use
estimates of Bn, B, and B
 to infer the amount of debt nancing allowed at the margin (x),
while holding all other parameters at their calibrated values. This gives us an alternative measure
of the aspects of the data that the model is able to capture, and those that it misses.
Two remarks are worth noting about estimating (10):
 Estimates of the individual coecients in the sums will be imprecise, due to the high
autocorrelation and the resulting collinearity. However, we are interested in sums of these
coecients, and those will still be precisely estimated.
 Although in theory the formulas (11), (12), and (13) work for any J  k+1, since all terms
in the sum should be zero for j > k + 1, the exponential term  j implies that estimates
would become very imprecise for large J. It is thus in practice important to choose a
parsimonious number of lags. We work with 4 lags, which implies that we assume that
public goods have an implementation delay of no more than 3 years.
We start our empirical analysis with a simple regression that predicts the natural log of per
capita scal variables based on contemporaneous population growth, mobility, and year dummies
alone.27 We cluster the standard errors by state. The results are presented in Table 3. Two clear
facts emerge from this table:28
 Population growth is very weakly related to state-level spending; and
 the higher the fraction of stayers in a state (i.e., the smaller the gross emigration rate), the
smaller is spending: a one standard deviation increase in the fraction of stayers increases
log capital spending per capita by approximately 2/3 of a standard deviation.
For the purpose of reconciling the evidence with the theory, it is interesting to see that both facts
are least pronounced in the case of purchases of land and existing structures, arguably the most
27In the case of purchases of land and existing structures we lose two state-year observations due to zeros.
28These facts match what was found by Poterba [19] in his cross-sectional analysis of state-level spending in
1962; see his Table 1.
22durable category of state spending. For this variable, a positive (but statistically insignicant)
association emerges with population growth, and the negative association with the fraction of
stayers is smallest and not statistically signicant.
Our identifying restriction is that the preference shock in (9) is uncorrelated with population
growth and mobility. In our preferred regression, we introduce several controls that are meant
to capture elements of the preference shock that may be correlated with demographics.
In Table 4, we run the same regression, but including all of our baseline controls. The inclusion
of controls only modestly aects the coecient on the fraction of stayers. For population growth,
coecients move from being weakly negative to weakly positive, but still much smaller than what
is needed to keep constant the amount of capital per capita (which would be (1   )=). Our
main conclusions are thus largely unchanged. It is particularly noteworthy that the correlation
between emigration and state-level spending is not due to a general inclination to mobility by
the residents of a state: our regressions show that more internal migration within a state is
associated with less spending. Aside from internal mobility, we nd that states with richer
populations spend more on capital goods. We also nd that states with younger populations
spend more on capital projects. This may be explained by the large role of states in the purchase
and construction of school buildings. Our political variable shows that capital spending does not
appear to be a partisan issue, whereas more liberal states have higher current expenses. Finally,
there is some evidence that urbanization is associated with less state-level spending.
In Table 5, we present results from the regression that best matches the theory. We assume
that public investment takes at most 3 years from the moment it is approved, which calls for
using the contemporaneous value and 4 lags of population growth and mobility,29 and calls
for lagging controls by 3 years.30 The table displays both discounted and undiscounted sums
29The time dimension in our panel regression spans 28 years, which should be long enough to avoid the short-
sample bias in estimating dynamic responses. In any case, our main interest is in the sum of the coecients and
not in identifying the precise lag correlation of spending with population growth and mobility.
30In equation (9), the most recent preference shock that should matter is given by Et kst, i.e., it is based on
information k years in the past. For goods for which k < 3, the 3-year lag of the control variable can be viewed
as an instrument for the k-year lag. In practice, all of our controls are very autocorrelated, and the number of
lags in the regression makes little dierence.
23of the coecients on population growth and the fractions of stayers: these sums conrm the
weak connection between population growth and capital spending, and the negative relationship
between stayers and capital spending.
The tables in the appendix show that our results are robust along several dimensions. First,
we combined state and local spending to check that our results are not driven by dierences
across states in the level of government that provides services. Our coecients of interest remain
very similar, while there are changes in the coecients for some of the controls. In particular, we
nd that internal migration and urbanization are no longer statistically signicant predictors of
spending. Second, in his study of U.S. counties, Rappaport [20] argues that there are endogenous
population movements towards small-government areas. His theory suggests that net migration
responds to government size. To ensure that our results are not driven by reverse causality, we
include a measure of net migration. This added variable has little eect on the large negative
coecients for stayers, the relevant measure for our model, which is equal to one minus gross
migration.31 Including net migration in our regressions also does not signicantly alter our
conclusions about the relationship of capital spending with population growth. Net migration
itself is weakly related to capital spending. Our data support Rappaport's theory in that we
nd a signicant negative coecient on net migration in the current spending regression. Third,
we conrmed that our results are robust to including the measure of political competition from
Besley, Persson, and Sturm [11],32 since they nd that it is a predictor of the mix of spending by
states. Finally, we look at the relationship between population growth, mobility, and spending
within states over time by including state xed eects. This modestly attenuates the eect of
mobility and increases the predictive power of population growth, but it does not substantively
alter our conclusions.
To see how the results in Table 5 square with the model, we need estimates of n and . For
31The correlation between stayers and net migration in our sample is low and negative: states where population
is churning in and out have a weak tendency to attract more residents.
32We are indebted to Torsten Persson for sharing their measure.
24population growth, our estimate from the data yields:
nst = 0:00121 + 0:875 nst 1 +error term
(0:000384) (0:0395)
(15)
For mobility, we have:
st = 0:0396 + 0:959 st 1 +error term
(0:00738) (0:00764)
(16)
Table 6 uses the results from Table 5 to compute estimates of Bn, B, and B
, and compares
them with the values predicted by the calibrated model, if we assume that 100% of capital
spending is nanced with debt at the margin, and none of current spending (the \golden rule").
For general capital, we use the baseline calibration of Table 1; for its subcategories, we use
dierent values of :  = 0:02 for purchases of land and existing structures,  = 0:15 for
equipment, and  = 0:05 for construction. In the case of current expenses, we set  = 1 (full
depreciation). The model prediction depends on the estimates of the autocorrelation coecients;
we incorporate this uncertainty by presenting a range based on the 95% condence interval.33
Looking at mobility rst, the model calibration implies that 100% borrowing is more than
what is needed to restore appropriate incentives for total capital expenditure, and hence that
the fraction of stayers in the state should have a negative eect on capital provision (by bringing
the economy closer to Ricardian equivalence and thus curtailing overspending). As is noted in
Inman [14] and Poterba [19], states with high mobility can use debt issuance to transfer the
funding of capital projects to future residents and therefore may demand more spending. While
current residents get some of the benets of the capital spending now, future residents pay. The
estimate of B
 from the data is indeed negative, supporting the qualitative conclusion of the
33In the case of the model, we obtain the implied range evaluating the expressions for each value of n and 
in their 95% condence interval, and taking the maximum and minimum of the result. With one exception (land
and population growth), our coecients are monotone in n or , so the maximum and minimum are attained
at the extremes of the condence interval. For the standard deviation of our estimated coecients, we combine
uncertainty about the autocorrelation and about each underlying parameter in the sums (11), (12), and (13)
using the delta method.
25model, but its magnitude is too big, even allowing a high elasticity of demand for the public
good. In the data, mobility is even more important than our model would suggest. This is even
more true for the discounted sum B, which according to theory should be slanted towards 0,
while it is not in the data. If we exclude highway spending, where federal transfers play a major
role, the estimated eect of mobility is still high, but now the condence interval for our estimates
has signicant overlap with the range from the theory. Columns (3) through (6) break down
total capital spending into its components. They highlight that our miss occurs in construction
expenditures: we would expect small coecients from the theory, since these are fairly durable
expenses and overprovision should be small, but the estimates from the data are actually biggest.
The theory captures well the role of purchases of land and existing structures: for these very
durable expenses, even 100% borrowing is not sucient according to our calibration, and a higher
fraction of stayers (in its level eect captured by B
) should increase spending. This is the only
component for which the data show no signicant negative relationship with the fraction of
stayers. In the case of current expenses, strict adherence to the golden rule makes mobility and
spending independent in the model. Our estimates suggest instead a negative and signicant
relationship. As we will show below, these coecients can be justied by the theory if states are
able to nance some of their current expenditures with debt, so we regard this miss as evidence
that states have some leeway to evade the strictures of the golden rule.
The model predictions about population growth are weaker, because of the osetting level
and time-trend eects. The model predicts small, but positive coecients, reecting the need
for additional investment when population is growing. The data show an insignicant negative
relationship, and there is a large overlap between the range dictated by theory and the condence
intervals of the estimates. One notable exception is for the most durable category of purchases
of land and existing structures. Here, the theory suggests a very large and positive coecient.
Since these are very durable expenses, the ow spending needed to keep up with depreciation is
small relative to the stock, and keeping a constant level per capita when population grows faster
requires a much bigger percentage increase in investment. On top of this, the theory predicts
underspending in this category of purchases, since more than 100% debt would be needed (or
26a longer maturity of debt). The time-trend eect (which dominates the level eect) boosts this
coecient further. We do observe evidence of a positive relationship in the data, although it is
imprecisely estimated and it is not as strong as the prediction of the theory.
In the previous analysis no parameter of the model was allowed to vary based on our empirical
ndings. We next give the model one degree of freedom by inferring values of x from our regression
results, while keeping all other parameters xed. Specically, we look for the values of x that
can match the regression coecients to those implied by the model. We rst present results from
matching each of Bn, B, and B
 independently. We then obtain a GMM estimate based on the
3 moments, and test the two overidentifying restrictions.
Table 7 presents our results.34
As can be seen from equations (11) and (12), when autocorrelation is close to 1    the
coecients Bn and B are not very sensitive to the fraction of debt nancing x. Since our
estimates are based on inverting this relationship, in this case the implied value of x is extremely
sensitive to autocorrelation, and it cannot be reliably inferred, resulting in standard errors so
large that no meaningful conclusion can be drawn. For inference based on Bn, this is particularly
an issue for equipment expenses (since n  0:88 and  = 0:15); for B, this aects total
expenditures, with or without highways (  0:96 and  = 0:06) and especially construction
( = 0:05).
For the cases in which reliable estimates can be derived from a single moment condition, the
table shows once again that the response of capital spending to population growth and mobility
(columns 1 through 5) is stronger in the data than we would expect in the model. In most cases, it
would take more than 100% debt nancing of capital expenses to justify the response we observe
in the data. Using all 3 moments jointly results in estimates that are generally closer to 100%
debt nancing;35 we can reject x = 1 for equipment and land, and marginally for construction.
34In computing the standard deviation, we assume independence of the errors from the regressions used to
estimate the autoregression coecients from those of the regressions that estimate the response of government
spending to our variables of interest.
35It may at rst be surprising that the estimate based on the 3 moments jointly is not a convex combination of
the estimates based on the individual moments. This is a natural consequence of the fact that the three moment
conditions are not independent. For two positively correlated random variables, if we observe one to be below its
27Except for land expenditures,36 our tightly parameterized model is still statistically rejected by
the data, but the magnitude of the P-values suggests that it would not take a major perturbation
to be able to reconcile the response of spending to population growth and mobility.
Column 7 presents the results for current expenditures. The values of x that are consistent
with the coecients on mobility are positive and statistically signicant, and the same happens
for the GMM estimate. This conforms well with the idea that the golden rule is not completely
successful at preventing states from borrowing to pay for these expenses, and that some leeway
remains.
5 Conclusion
We begin with an explicit political economy model where population growth and mobility lead
to departures from Ricardian equivalence. In our model, population dynamics cause voters to
discount the future more heavily than eciency would dictate. We derive a testable prediction
that, in the presence of high degrees of debt nancing, we should observe a positive relationship
between capital spending and mobility for rapidly depreciating capital goods and a negative
relationship for slowly depreciating assets. Our results are supportive of this prediction, but
we nd that greater mobility is associated with higher capital spending to a somewhat greater
degree than can be explained by the theory.
Our results suggest two avenues of future research. First, if mobility and capital spending are
related in the way we highlight in the paper, individual-level expectations of mobility should be
predictive of individual voting behavior; this could be tested with more disaggregated political
data, particularly for debt referenda.
Second, our evidence suggests that some of the costs of current state expenditures are shifted
to future residents despite restrictions on the issuance of debt for current expenditure. How
states do so in practice is an interesting question. One area of current expenditure that deserves
unconditional mean, we expect the second one to also be below its unconditional mean.
36Interestingly, land, along with current expenditures, is the only case for which all estimates from individual
moments are fairly reliable.
28further scrutiny is the treatment of pension obligations. As is noted by Inman [14], while current
residents benet from the services provided by current workers, if pensions and other benets
are underfunded, future residents will bear some of the cost. Current residents therefore have an
incentive to underfund pensions. Exploring the theoretical and empirical relationship between
population dynamics and pension funding could be analyzed with a similar type of model.
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31Parameter Assigned Value Comment
 0.96
 0.06
 1   2 1=15  0:045 Half-life of debt: 15 years
n 0.875 Estimate from data
 0.959 Estimate from data
 0.2 Lower range of estimates surveyed by DelRossi and Inman [12]
x 1 100% debt nancing allowed for capital projects
k 2 Typical implementation delay (years)
Table 1: Baseline calibration
32Variable Label Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total capital spending ($) TOTCAP 340.7 211.6 85.7 2367.5
Non-highway capital spending ($) NHCAP 140.7 132.3 28.5 1724.5
Land and purch. of existing structures ($) LAND 18.60 24.13 0 437.76
Equipment purchases ($) EQUIP 44.60 27.08 5.15 305.69
Construction spending ($) CONSTR 277.5 182.7 47.6 2142.5
Non-highway construction spending ($) NHCONSTR 93.31 105.65 8.45 1308.94
Current expenditures ($) CURRENT 2711 1259 1031 13810
Population growth (yearly) POPGR 0.01075 0.01140 -0.05722 0.08632
Fraction staying in state (1-yr horizon) STAY 0.9661 0.0129 0.8688 0.9846
Fraction moving within state (5-yr horizon) INTMIG 0.3769 0.04461 0.2599 0.5240
State personal income ($ thousands) STATEINC 27.91 6.74 14.2 55
Fraction high-school graduates EDU 0.7747 0.0975 0.4726 0.93
Fraction population urban URBAN 0.6960 0.1471 0.322 0.9503
Pop. density (thousands per sq. mile) DENSITY 0.1433 0.1859 0.0006 0.9903
Fraction of population over the age of 65 OVER65 0.1208 0.0216 0.0230 0.1855
Fraction of population under the age of 25 UNDER25 0.3780 0.0393 0.2974 0.5248
Homeownership rate HOMEOWN 0.6752 0.0548 0.4808 0.813
Liberalism index LIB 0 0.9426 -2.0404 2.0234
Fraction of U.S. population living in state SIZE 0.02 0.02148 0.00172 0.12166
Table 2: Summary statistics. All monetary values are expressed in per capita 2007$.
33(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGR -4.119 -1.853 11.69 -1.617 -5.638* -1.954 -7.482***
(2.747) (3.829) (7.545) (3.529) (2.846) (4.453) (2.610)
STAY -23.54*** -20.61*** -8.143 -18.53*** -25.21*** -22.32*** -13.46***
(2.611) (5.879) (7.267) (2.657) (2.589) (6.888) (4.653)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1600 1600 1598 1600 1600 1600 1600
R-squared 0.536 0.336 0.067 0.451 0.517 0.279 0.495
Table 3: Regression of spending on population growth and the fraction of stayers, with no controls and no lags. Year
dummies are included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*) levels.
3
4(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGR 2.896 4.810* 13.91** 5.089** 1.140 4.103 -0.389
(2.164) (2.853) (6.435) (2.427) (2.465) (3.425) (1.602)
STAY -20.25*** -14.48*** -10.27 -11.93*** -21.41*** -16.10*** -10.06***
(3.114) (4.097) (9.846) (2.420) (3.381) (4.753) (2.495)
INTMIG -2.580** -4.727*** -1.813 -3.040** -2.273** -5.178*** -3.217***
(1.057) (1.570) (2.793) (1.439) (1.060) (1.686) (0.736)
STATEINC 0.0271*** 0.0253** 0.00708 0.0356*** 0.0272** 0.0246* 0.00982
(0.0100) (0.0124) (0.0266) (0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0144) (0.00720)
EDU -0.132 0.327 -0.0256 -0.0881 -0.212 0.251 1.140***
(0.616) (0.683) (1.469) (0.618) (0.687) (0.849) (0.341)
URBAN -0.648* -0.151 -0.0339 -0.661** -0.656* 0.0476 -0.707**
(0.327) (0.425) (0.718) (0.320) (0.351) (0.477) (0.269)
DENSITY 0.0563 0.126 0.775 -0.289 0.0946 0.230 0.135
(0.157) (0.304) (0.641) (0.281) (0.163) (0.361) (0.216)
OVER65 2.054 -5.352* -2.911 1.888 2.041 -9.186** -4.228**
(1.941) (2.911) (6.468) (2.127) (1.995) (3.644) (1.980)
UNDER25 5.364*** 3.637* -0.544 7.409*** 5.392*** 1.759 1.043
(1.463) (1.855) (3.974) (1.780) (1.548) (2.372) (1.149)
HOMEOWN -1.182* -2.371*** -0.330 -0.849 -1.295** -2.634*** -1.090**
(0.630) (0.884) (1.848) (0.799) (0.627) (0.974) (0.511)
LIB 0.0285 0.0686 -0.0775 0.0188 0.0335 0.0897* 0.0730***
(0.0379) (0.0460) (0.0935) (0.0388) (0.0409) (0.0522) (0.0198)
SIZE -2.051 -2.060 1.905 -2.664 -2.720 -1.858 0.0332
(1.771) (2.241) (5.364) (1.646) (1.890) (2.489) (1.660)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1600 1600 1598 1600 1600 1600 1600
R-squared 0.647 0.577 0.106 0.569 0.616 0.529 0.743
Table 4: Regression of spending on population growth and the fraction of stayers, including controls but no lags. Year
dummies are included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*) levels.
3
5(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt 1:032 1:065 7:920 1:832  0:216  1:018  0:726
(2:257) (3:323) (7:880) (3:245) (2:287) (3:412) (1:875)
POPGRt 1 5:365 8:034 4:020 8:067 5:215 9:028  0:356
(1:449) (3:052) (6:995) (2:959) (1:622) (3:478) (0:620)
POPGRt 2  2:503 1:015  1:093  2:285  2:729 2:045  0:0952
(1:321) (2:204) (6:073) (2:525) (1:490) (3:099) (0:729)
POPGRt 3 3:360 2:718 2:823 3:528 3:314 3:761  0:867
(2:003) (2:736) (4:538) (1:765) (2:396) (3:928) (0:517)
POPGRt 4  7:896  9:647 7:900  10:55  8:650  10:32  0:145
(3:159) (4:874) (9:604) (2:611) (3:509) (6:417) (1:640)
STAYt  15:78  5:080  6:703  9:239  16:91  4:553  1:739
(4:939) (4:404) (22:45) (6:527) (5:538) (5:835) (3:280)
STAYt 1  9:431  11:36  11:78  4:834  10:85  14:57  1:797
(3:739) (5:988) (11:80) (6:117) (4:071) (7:533) (2:283)
STAYt 2 2:692 0:532 20:40 4:387 1:687  2:866 3:721
(2:857) (4:108) (13:90) (5:907) (3:100) (6:064) (1:727)
STAYt 3 0:0421  3:589  13:65  4:127 0:504  0:449  1:526
(5:082) (8:048) (12:44) (6:175) (5:730) (10:95) (1:110)
STAYt 4  0:207 3:763 10:65  1:244 1:102 4:949  9:277
(4:927) (10:21) (17:27) (5:684) (5:230) (12:69) (4:534)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted:  0:642 3:18 21:6 0:588  3:07 3:50  2:19
(3:15) (4:46) (10:6) (3:40) (3:49) (5:33) (2:67)
POPGR, discounted (Bn):  4:54  0:810 28:7  4:65  7:61 0:00469  2:80
(5:02) (7:14) (16:9) (5:20) (5:60) (8:76) (3:74)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  22:7  15:7  1:08  15:1  24:5  17:5  10:6
(3:63) (4:67) (12:1) (3:11) (3:97) (5:70) (3:29)
STAY, discounted (B):  22:9  16:0 0:308  15:7  24:5  17:5  12:3
(4:02) (5:40) (12:6) (3:11) (4:35) (6:51) (3:98)
Table 5: Continued on the next page
3
6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG  1:867  4:165  1:446  3:085  1:415  4:481  3:070
(1:180) (1:728) (2:981) (1:554) (1:190) (1:900) (0:770)
STATEINC 0:0272 0:0306 0:0219 0:0315 0:0273 0:0297 0:0116
(0:0120) (0:0148) (0:0256) (0:0117) (0:0130) (0:0176) (0:0104)
EDU  0:0190 0:363  0:242 0:135  0:106 0:432 1:047
(0:640) (0:713) (1:529) (0:626) (0:722) (0:906) (0:365)
URBAN  0:624  0:224  0:261  0:552  0:625  0:0692  0:745
(0:349) (0:471) (0:810) (0:339) (0:371) (0:548) (0:308)
DENSITY 0:219 0:240 0:767  0:200 0:275 0:397 0:203
(0:167) (0:328) (0:663) (0:272) (0:174) (0:405) (0:225)
OVER65 2:451  4:643  1:399 1:500 2:455  8:495  3:903
(1:891) (2:890) (6:980) (1:951) (1:947) (3:759) (1:794)
UNDER25 5:432 4:410 1:322 6:873 5:428 2:698 1:203
(1:512) (2:013) (4:856) (1:704) (1:624) (2:660) (1:400)
HOMEOWN  1:101  2:216  1:322  1:078  1:132  2:328  1:181
(0:678) (0:901) (1:987) (0:897) (0:672) (1:017) (0:507)
LIB 0:0222 0:0665  0:0857 0:0109 0:0288 0:0924 0:0685
(0:0390) (0:0459) (0:100) (0:0402) (0:0420) (0:0519) (0:0210)
SIZE  1:637  1:495  1:269  1:560  2:194  0:955 0:361
(1:853) (2:265) (5:723) (1:770) (1:958) (2:535) (1:621)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1400 1400 1398 1400 1400 1400 1400
R-squared 0.636 0.574 0.106 0.539 0.610 0.532 0.752
Table 5: Regression of spending on population growth and the fraction of stayers and their lags,
including controls. Year dummies are included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
3
7(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Total Capital Total Capital Land and Equipment Construction Construction Current




Data: -4.54 -0.81 28.7 -4.65 -7.61 0.005 -2.80
(5.02) (7.14) (16.9) (5.20) (5.60) (8.76) (3.74)
Model: -1.3 { 17.9 -1.3 { 17.9 59 { 71 1.1 { 23.2 1.4 { 19.4 1.4 { 19.4 0
B
Data: -22.9 -16.0 0.30 -15.7 -24.5 -17.5 -12.3
(4.02) (5.40) (12.6) (3.11) (4.35) (6.51) (3.98)
Model: -6.6 { -0.7 -6.6 { -0.7 -16.7 { -3.9 -24.8 { -15.2 -3.6 { 0.8 -3.6 { 0.8 0
B

Data: -22.7 -15.7 -1.08 -15.1 -24.5 -17.5 -12.3
(3.63) (4.67) (12.1) (3.11) (3.97) (5.70) (3.29)
Model: -10.8 { -8.5 -10.8 { -8.5 7.9 { 12.6 -27.7 { -20.4 -6.8 { -5.7 -6.8 { -5.7 0
Table 6: Comparison of coecients of interest in the regression with their predicted values according to the baseline
calibration of our model, assuming that state governments follow the golden rule.
3
8(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Capital Total Capital Land and Equipment Construction Construction Current
Spending Less Highways Purchases Less Highways Expenditures
of Existing
Structures
x needed to match coecient on Bn:
1.19 1.13 1.10 -0.98 1.20 1.11 -0.13
(0.18) (0.17) (0.07) (2.92) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17)
x needed to match B:
2.06 1.68 1.17 0.89 3.13 2.49 0.31
(0.56) (0.46) (0.18) (0.11) (1.90) (1.46) (0.10)
x needed to match B
:
1.26 1.12 1.18 0.80 1.35 1.22 0.29
(0.07) (0.09) (0.20) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
GMM estimate of x based on the 3 moments jointly:
1.05 0.94 1.17 0.61 1.10 0.99 0.15
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
P-value of the overidentifying restrictions:
0.002 0.03 0.60 0.0011 0.0003 0.04 0.09
Table 7: Indirect estimates of the fraction of debt nancing derived from estimates of Bn, B, and B
, and test of the

















Fraction of debt financing x Fraction of stayers θ




















Fraction of debt financing x Fraction of stayers θ
Figure 2: Logarithm of public good provision with no pop. growth and constant mobility rate,
 = 0:06.











Fraction of debt financing x
Figure 3: Coecients Bn (solid), B (dashed), and B
 (dotted).










Elasticity of demand for the public good
Figure 4: Coecients Bn (solid), B (dashed), and B
 (dotted).









Figure 5: Coecients Bn (solid), B (dashed), and B
 (dotted).










Figure 6: Coecients B (dashed), and B
 (dotted).
45A Ecient Allocations
Since households have linear preferences in private consumption, we are in a transferable utility
environment, and the Pareto frontier can be derived by maximizing the sum of the utilities of
all the households. This maximization will uniquely determine aggregate private consumption,
but not its distribution across people: the Pareto frontier is traced by varying this distribution.
Letting Ct be average per capita consumption in period t and Nst the number of residents of




















subject to (2) for each state, and to the aggregate resource constraint
X
s2U.S.A.
Nst[y   Ct   st]  0; t  0 (18)
The expectation in (17) is taken with respect to the population count in each state (governed by
the stochastic process for population growth) and the preference shock.
The rst-order conditions for this problem yield
stG
 
st = 1   (1   ):
B Denition of an Equilibrium
This denition is similar to the one in Bassetto with Sargent [7]. All the notation that is not
explicitly dened here is the same as in our main text.
A tax-debt policy are bounded sequences ffTst;Bstgs2U.S.A.g1
t=0. A price system is a sequence
frtg1
t=0.
We consider the problem of a household that starts at time t, taking as given the price system
















37As mentioned in the text, for simplicity we abstract from death, so the household has an innite life span.
Because of population growth, new households do enter into the economy every period.
46subject to the ow budget constraint
cj + aj + Tsjj  (1 + rj)aj 1 + y; (20)
where aj are a households' assets at the end of period j, and sj is the state where the household
resides in period j. In equation (19), the expectation is over two sources of uncertainty. First,
an individual household is uncertain about sj (except for the initial period). We assume that
location follows a Markov process, where the probability distribution over the state of residence
next period only depends on the state of residence in the current period; this distribution is
assumed to be common to all households. A full description of this uncertainty would require
the entire 50  50 (time-varying) transition matrix. However, for the Markov equilibria that we
will consider it is sucient to keep track of the probability of leaving a given state s conditional
on residing there in period j, which is 1   sj and is assumed to follow a AR(1) process as
described in the main text. The second source of uncertainty is the preference shock on the
public good, sjj. We assume that this shock is bounded and that it is common to all households
residing in the same state. Since our empirical analysis clusters standard errors at the state level,
no further assumption is needed on its distribution.
To prevent Ponzi schemes, a household must also face a lower bound on assets; we assume
that aj is uniformly bounded from below.38
The household problem has a solution only if rj = (1   )=. When this interest rate
prevails, a household is indierent about all consumption and asset proles that meet its budget
constraint; it is thus not necessary to keep track of individual consumption and saving decisions
across time and for dierent realizations of the shocks, and households will be willing to absorb




















We dene a competitive equilibrium from time t as a real allocation fCj;fsj;Gsjgs2U:S:A:g1
j=t,
a tax-debt policy ffTsj;Bsjgs2U.S.A.g1
j=t, a price system frjg1
j=t, and initial conditions fBst 1gs2U.S.A.,
such that:
38aj is a random variable adapted to the history of the households' residence states and to the aggregate shocks.
47(i) rj = (1   )= 8j  t, ensuring that the households' problem has a solution;
(ii) at any time j, the allocation satises the feasibility conditions (2) and (18);
(iii) the state government budget constraints and debt limits (3) and (4) hold for all states and
in every period.
Next we dene a political-economic equilibrium in which residents of a state collectively
choose public spending and investment each period. To evaluate those choices, households must
form expectations about the evolution of the economy. A history of the economy is a sequence
ht  ff(Gs;j 1;sj;sj;nsj)gs2U.S.A.gt
j=0, for any t  0, where fGs 1gs2U.S.A. is an exogenous
initial condition.39 We dene a political-economic equilibrium in terms of a mapping 	 dened
as follows:
 To each history ht, 	 associated a time-t provision of public capital fGst(ht)gs2U.S.A.;
 to each history ht and capital level fGstgs2U.S.A., which need not coincide with fGst(ht)gs2U.S.A.,
the mapping 	 associates an allocation (C(ht;fGstgs2U.S.A.);fs(ht;fGstgs2U.S.A.)gs2U.S.A.),
and a time-t tax-debt policy (fBs(ht;fGstgs2U.S.A.);Ts(ht;fGstgs2U.S.A.)gs2U.S.A.).
Given any history hj, each mapping 	 recursively generates a history from hj, along with





From any initial condition hj, j  0, the sequence of histories recursively generated as above in-
duce an allocation and a tax/debt policy from the initial conditions f(Gsj 1;sj;sj;nsj)gs2U.S.A.,
which are part of hj, and fBs(hj 1;fGsj 1gs2U.S.A.)gs2U.S.A..40
A mapping ~ 	  (f ~ G; ~ C; ~ ; ~ B; ~ T) is a political-economic equilibrium when it has the following
properties.
39Although other variables could be introduced as part of the history, it can be shown that their presence would
be redundant with the denition of an equilibrium below.
40hj 1 is the predecessor of the history hj. When we consider an initial history h0, fBs(h 1)gs2U.S.A. is an
initial level that is exogenously given.
48(i) (Competitive equilibrium) Given any history hj, including the null history, the real alloca-
tions and the tax/debt policy induced by ~ 	 form a competitive equilibrium, together with
the constant interest rate (1   )=.
(ii) (Self-interested voting) Given any history hj, j  0, ~ Gs(hj 1) is the policy preferred by
residents of the state s at time j, assuming that in the future the economy will follow the
path implied by ~ 	, and taking as given the contemporaneous political choice of residents
of other states. Using (21), this requires that the following inequality holds for all values
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(22)
where the following denitions hold:
 ^ Gs(hj) = ~ Gs(hj) 8s 6= S; ^ GS(hj) = G. In words, this is the public good provision
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j+t 1);sj+t;sj+t;nsj+t)gs2U.S.A.); t > 1 :
these are the histories induced by 	 if no deviations occur.
49In equation (22), sj+t is a random variable that is determined by the exogenous stochastic
process for mobility, conditional on sj = S. Notice that all residents of the state face
the same mobility process, and hence they share the same preferences over public good
provision.
(iii) (Budget balance) Given any history hj, any realization of shocks and political decisions,








j 1;fGsj 1gs2U.S.A.) + (1   x)[GSj   (1   )GS j 1];
(23)
where Gsj 1 is the appropriate element of the history hj.
Requirement (i) states that no matter what happened in the past, ~ 	 prescribes a path that is a
competitive equilibrium. Requirement (ii) states that at each time j, residents of each state prefer
not to deviate from the equilibrium path prescribed by ~ 	, taking into account how a deviation
eects contemporaneous utility and also how it aects the future by altering subsequent histories.
Requirement (iii) embodies the limit on the ability to borrow to pay for public spending, and
the repayment schedule on existing debt.
The denition above allows for arbitrary dependence on histories, including equilibria in
which a deviation by a state triggers responses in other states.
We focus on Markov equilibria, in which public good provision Gst is independent of the past
and also of the choices and shocks of all other states; Gst is only aected by the contemporaneous
realizations st;st;nst.
Proposition 1 A Markov equilibrium (dened above) exists and is unique.
Proof. The proof is by construction. In the main text, we showed that, if the future provision
of public goods only depends on future realizations of the shocks, then residents will choose Gst
according to equation (6). This choice is unique, and it only depends on the contemporaneous
shocks, verifying the Markov nature of the equilibrium.
50C Derivation of Equation (9)
Suppose that investment is decided k years ahead of time. Let GTOT
st be the total stock of public
capital in state s and period t (i.e., GTOT
st  GstNst, where Nst is the population in state s at
time t. We conjecture (and verify) an equilibrium in which GTOT
st is independent of the past.
To solve for the equilibrium, it is useful to rewrite (2), (3), and (4) in total terms, rather than
as per capita quantities:41
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TOT

















st  (1   x)
TOT
st + ( + r)B
TOT
st 1: (26)
Using the equations above, we can derive the consequences that the voters expect from a
marginal increase in GTOT
st enacted by a vote in period t   k:






 Increase in total taxes in period t: 1   x;
 Decrease in total investment in period t+1: 1  (due to the conjecture about the nature
of the equilibrium);
 Change in total taxes in period t + 1:
( + r)x   (1   )(1   x);
 Change in total taxes in subsequent periods t + j, j > 1:
( + r)(1   )
j 2(   )x:
41Since we already know that the interest rate is constant, we dropped its time subscript here.
51These costs and benets are exactly the same, independently of the planning horizon; what
changes is the information available to voters when they compute their expected value.
It is straightforward to see that the probability of moving between t   k and t is irrelevant
from the voters' perspective: the outcome of the vote will only aect them if they are still in state
at time t, so their vote will maximize utility conditional on this realization. Their rst-order
















[x(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Equation (27) takes into account that an individual will pay taxes on a per capita basis.
As in the main text, we linearize this expression around nst = 0 and st = 1, and assume an
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In equation (28), note that the logGst is uncertain as of time t k because of population growth,
even though GTOT
st is known:






















Next, linearizing the investment equation we obtain
logst  log +
1





Combining (28), (29), and (30), we obtain (9).
52D Robustness Experiments
The tables that follow show how our results survive to a number of robustness checks.
 Table 8 uses a dierent measure of stayers, based on Census data. When we use the Census
Migration measure, we are able to expand our sample to the years 1959-2007 for the con-
tiguous states and to 1963-2007 for Alaska and Hawaii.42 The Census asked for information
on current state of residence and state of residence ve years prior. We dene movers for
a given year as one-fth of the fraction of the population living in a state ve years prior
to the Census and living in a dierent state in the Census year. We interpolate between
the years ve years prior to consecutive Censuses. For the years following 1995 (data for
1995 is measured in the 2000 Census), we forecast migration based on state xed eects,
state specic time trends, and demographic variables (educational attainment, homeowner-
ship, urbanization, population, income, poverty rates, and population age structure). The
correlation between the IRS and Census Mobility measures is .95 through 1995 and .85
after 1995. This regression conrms our key facts: a weak relationship between population
growth and spending for all variables except for purchases of land and existing structures,
and a signicant negative relationship between the fraction of stayers and spending (again,
except for land).
 We repeat our exercise excluding Alaska and Hawaii (Table 9). While Hawaii is not partic-
ularly dierent from other states, Alaska is a large outlier owing to its particular economy
and geography. Our nding on the relationship between mobility, population growth, and
capital spending are robust to restricting the sample to the contiguous 48 states. The
relationship between the fraction of stayers and spending remains negative and signi-
cant, albeit somewhat smaller and actually closer to the values predicted by the theoretical
model.
 Not all states split responsibilities in the same way between the state and local governments.
42The Alaska and Hawaii data is limited due to the absence of political variables as well as information on
educational attainment in the years leading up to and including 1959, when these states joined the union.
53To check that our results are not driven by systematic variation in this split, Table 10
repeats our exercise combining state and local spending.43 We do not have separate data
on purchases of land and structures and equipment at the local level, so we are forced to
lump the two. When we combine state and local expenditures, capital spending is more
responsive to population growth, closer to what our theoretical model would predict. The
coecient on the fraction of stayers drops, but it remains negative and signicant (except
for the combined land/equipment category); this coecient too gets closer to the model
predictions. One other change worth of note is that mobility within the state (INTMIG)
ceases to be a signicant predictor of spending.
 Table 11 includes net domestic migration and its lags as a separate regressor.44 In our
model, net migration plays no independent role. However, Rappaport [20] proposes a
theory where government spending drives net migration, and in this case our results could
be aected by reverse causation. As we can see from the table, the inclusion of net migration
has very little eect on our estimates for the coecients on the fraction of stayers. This
is not surprising, because net and gross migration are very weakly correlated: in our
sample, the correlation between stayers and net migration is -0.18. Net migration is more
closely linked to population growth. Including net migration does have some eect on
the coecients for population growth, but the changes show no systematic pattern and
do not alter our main conclusions. In line with Rappaport's ndings at the local level,
net migration itself is negatively related to current spending, while no clear relationship
emerges for capital spending.
 Besley, Persson, and Sturm [11] argue that political competition is an important determi-
nant of the mix of state spending. To check that our results are not driven by correlation
with this omitted variable, we include the measure (labeled POLCOMP) as an additional
43The Census Bureau did not report data on local spending for 2001 and 2003, so we dropped those two years
from the sample.
44Our variable is dened as the ratio of net new comers in a given year from the IRS data to the total population
of the state in the previous year.
54control in Table 12. Data limitations restrict our sample to 1980-2004.45 Our conclusions
are largely unaected. The main change is a reduction (in absolute value) in the coecients
of stayers on non-highway total spending and construction, to values closer to what our
theoretical model would predict; the coecient on purchases of land and existing structures
increases, but remains imprecisely estimated. These changes are due to the dierent sam-
ple period; POLCOMP has very little eect on our coecients of interest. Our regression
indirectly conrms Besley, Persson, and Sturm's ndings about POLCOMP: our point es-
timates indicate that more political competition has a bigger (negative) proportional eect
on current spending than on capital spending, thus raising the share of spending devoted
to capital. However, these estimates are not statistically signicant given our dierent
controls and identication strategy.
 Finally, we check whether our results survive if we restrict ourselves to within-state variation
by including state xed eects; this is done in Table 13. Our coecients on stayers are
remarkably robust to this big change in our identication strategy. In contrast, within a
state, population growth seems to have a more positive eect on capital spending than
across states, with coecients closer to what would be predicted by the theoretical model.
45We have POLCOMP up to 2001; since all of our controls are lagged 3 years, in accordance with the procedure
for dealing with implementation lags, this implies that 2004 is the last year of usable data for our spending
variables.
55(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt  0:0413 0:771 3:866 1:532  0:568 0:318  0:180
(1:074) (1:367) (2:690) (1:345) (1:081) (1:500) (0:826)
POPGRt 1 1:348 2:321  0:862 2:634 1:231 2:272  0:0910
(0:433) (0:886) (2:281) (1:037) (0:507) (0:927) (0:428)
POPGRt 2 0:109  0:0697 3:758  0:420  0:0975  0:825  0:741
(0:590) (1:037) (2:106) (0:928) (0:659) (1:043) (0:379)
POPGRt 3 0:898 2:208 2:331  0:244 0:784 2:084 0:0795
(0:591) (1:273) (2:141) (1:001) (0:624) (1:371) (0:493)
POPGRt 4  1:463  2:175 5:207  2:116  2:013  1:973  0:282
(1:039) (1:473) (2:278) (1:230) (1:113) (1:945) (0:754)
STAYt  37:72  6:834 8:092  12:05  40:28  20:28 5:391
(24:40) (30:36) (54:71) (18:18) (26:03) (35:25) (17:84)
STAYt 1 5:198  4:869  56:25 6:525 3:195  1:136  0:986
(9:512) (16:02) (40:49) (12:33) (10:48) (22:13) (4:881)
STAYt 2  1:753 0:844  0:660 24:83  3:591 0:592 4:312
(9:640) (16:34) (52:46) (14:26) (10:61) (20:47) (4:705)
STAYt 3 33:94 38:29 96:12 16:53 30:69 50:33 17:18
(13:23) (22:84) (65:11) (15:73) (13:93) (29:58) (6:446)
STAYt 4  28:53  38:66  49:73  46:81  21:45  45:04  37:21
(20:19) (27:69) (51:25) (17:26) (21:38) (36:43) (18:15)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted: 0:851 3:06 14:3 1:38  0:664 1:88  1:21
(2:55) (3:51) (6:63) (2:60) (2:69) (3:74) (2:14)
POPGR, discounted (Bn): 0:488 2:92 20:1 0:0248  1:55 1:58  1:61
(3:50) (5:03) (9:10) (3:52) (3:72) (5:37) (2:88)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  28:9  11:2  2:43  11:0  31:4  15:5  11:3
(5:35) (5:71) (12:7) (5:56) (5:95) (7:19) (2:91)
STAY, discounted (B):  29:5  13:3  1:10  14:8  31:4  17:0  15:4
(5:24) (7:31) (13:6) (5:19) (5:72) (8:60) (3:64)
Table 8: Continued on the next page
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6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG  1:775  3:681  0:531  0:928  1:704  3:974  2:841
(0:888) (1:376) (1:760) (1:284) (0:887) (1:502) (0:716)
STATEINC 0:0283 0:0490 0:0229 0:0425 0:0299 0:0628 0:0221
(0:0122) (0:0151) (0:0224) (0:0142) (0:0128) (0:0164) (0:0106)
EDU  0:277 0:227 0:111  0:348  0:377  0:147 1:252
(0:513) (0:655) (1:115) (0:583) (0:548) (0:783) (0:390)
URBAN  0:394  0:135 0:0740  0:275  0:429  0:171  0:585
(0:269) (0:395) (0:542) (0:298) (0:289) (0:460) (0:250)
DENSITY  0:193  0:240 0:394  0:444  0:195  0:202  0:159
(0:156) (0:345) (0:530) (0:289) (0:148) (0:410) (0:241)
OVER65 0:0853  4:411  3:524 1:384 0:221  5:436  3:175
(1:975) (2:598) (5:339) (2:380) (2:062) (3:138) (1:825)
UNDER25 2:256 3:589  1:409 5:903 2:356 3:606 1:085
(1:598) (1:811) (2:518) (1:711) (1:709) (2:173) (1:165)
HOMEOWN  0:571  2:511 0:133  0:0143  0:692  2:487  0:675
(0:509) (0:799) (1:277) (0:733) (0:508) (0:861) (0:508)
LIB 0:00436 0:0333  0:00966 0:00473 0:00220 0:0366 0:0674
(0:0297) (0:0367) (0:0579) (0:0326) (0:0316) (0:0414) (0:0216)
SIZE  1:986  3:179  0:783  5:214  2:345  2:915  1:207
(1:366) (1:986) (4:028) (1:873) (1:461) (2:180) (1:836)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,442 2,442 2,440 2,442 2,442 2,442 2,442
R-squared 0.622 0.601 0.218 0.717 0.605 0.612 0.723
Table 8: Robustness to measure of stayers and to length of sample: the fraction of stayers
is here based on Census data. Regression of spending on population growth and the fraction of
stayers and their lags, including controls. Year dummies are included, and standard errors are
clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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7(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt 0:405  0:616 9:140 2:140  0:914  3:150 0:0365
(2:718) (3:538) (9:708) (3:549) (2:858) (3:715) (1:622)
POPGRt 1 5:318 9:764 2:513 6:330 5:222 11:50 0:502
(2:034) (3:219) (8:601) (3:229) (2:297) (3:679) (0:675)
POPGRt 2  2:714 1:057  2:774  0:821  2:895 2:037  0:265
(1:503) (2:838) (7:720) (2:694) (1:759) (4:085) (0:767)
POPGRt 3 2:831 4:336 4:817 4:164 2:210 5:404  0:491
(1:949) (2:957) (5:570) (2:220) (2:267) (4:587) (0:688)
POPGRt 4  6:415  11:15 12:01  10:73  6:950  12:33  0:698
(3:071) (4:923) (8:659) (2:951) (3:446) (6:704) (1:093)
STAYt  15:56  5:421  12:71  7:673  16:83  5:507  5:193
(6:029) (5:242) (22:52) (6:800) (6:863) (6:401) (3:870)
STAYt 1  11:75  17:33  15:49  4:046  13:49  22:96  4:041
(3:777) (5:679) (14:80) (6:502) (4:038) (6:707) (2:232)
STAYt 2 1:384  2:745 29:99 4:001  0:493  7:656 2:446
(3:331) (4:938) (12:63) (6:936) (3:761) (8:473) (1:574)
STAYt 3 3:313  0:187  19:75  8:710 5:148 7:405  0:135
(4:475) (9:230) (16:13) (7:445) (5:099) (13:16) (1:188)
STAYt 4 3:298 17:59 30:56 4:977 3:917 19:46 2:415
(6:239) (9:295) (22:46) (6:998) (6:773) (12:11) (2:946)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted:  0:575 3:39 25:7 1:08  3:33 3:47  0:916
(3:35) (4:20) (8:56) (3:11) (3:82) (5:64) (1:93)
POPGR, discounted (Bn):  3:76  0:609 36:0  3:76  7:27  0:284  1:66
(5:17) (6:84) (13:9) (4:94) (5:96) (9:16) (2:65)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  19:3  8:09 12:6  11:5  21:7  9:25  4:51
(4:87) (5:19) (9:96) (3:40) (5:32) (7:39) (2:33)
STAY, discounted (B):  18:6  5:90 17:5  11:5  21:0  6:39  4:05
(5:52) (5:54) (10:7) (3:41) (6:02) (8:05) (2:57)
Table 9: Continued on the next page
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8(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG  1:511  2:705 1:213  2:433  1:192  2:769  3:008
(1:450) (2:038) (3:289) (2:127) (1:396) (2:028) (0:749)
STATEINC 0:0165 0:0121  0:00508 0:0246 0:0173 0:00939  0:00564
(0:0120) (0:0129) (0:0273) (0:0127) (0:0134) (0:0160) (0:00805)
EDU 0:111 0:600 0:108 0:201 0:0133 0:700 1:251
(0:623) (0:679) (1:555) (0:628) (0:705) (0:871) (0:331)
URBAN  0:476  0:137  0:272  0:516  0:459  0:00521  0:375
(0:368) (0:380) (0:831) (0:374) (0:400) (0:436) (0:263)
DENSITY 0:300 0:581 1:424  0:0562 0:320 0:798 0:212
(0:224) (0:366) (0:719) (0:367) (0:222) (0:431) (0:209)
OVER65 3:247  3:397 2:682 2:652 3:062  7:353  2:459
(1:841) (2:522) (5:715) (1:845) (2:034) (3:473) (1:249)
UNDER25 4:821 3:318 0:305 6:727 4:797 1:445 0:0176
(1:456) (1:661) (4:426) (1:696) (1:591) (2:298) (1:055)
HOMEOWN  0:862  1:352 0:314  0:694  0:979  1:344  0:782
(0:781) (1:178) (2:006) (1:194) (0:735) (1:208) (0:417)
LIB 0:0158 0:0329  0:131 0:00323 0:0243 0:0510 0:0614
(0:0363) (0:0380) (0:0997) (0:0370) (0:0401) (0:0466) (0:0161)
SIZE  1:997  1:911  1:631  1:771  2:560  1:341  0:469
(1:850) (2:086) (5:175) (1:768) (1:981) (2:477) (1:620)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,344 1,344 1,342 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344
R-squared 0.540 0.460 0.126 0.446 0.516 0.428 0.760
Table 9: Robustness to excluding Alaska and Hawaii. Regression of spending on population
growth and the fraction of stayers and their lags, including controls. Year dummies are included,
and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*) levels.
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9(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP EQUIP& LAND CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt  0:00532  0:342 2:171  0:566  0:981  1:723
(1:628) (2:093) (1:910) (1:737) (2:329) (1:065)
POPGRt 1 3:702 3:729 3:327 3:795 3:986  0:198
(1:132) (1:192) (1:521) (1:435) (1:667) (0:508)
POPGRt 2  1:679  0:105 1:862  2:494  0:857  0:454
(1:307) (1:632) (1:944) (1:403) (1:838) (0:419)
POPGRt 3 3:529 3:584 3:170 3:570 4:004  0:0781
(1:403) (1:643) (1:736) (1:641) (2:022) (0:537)
POPGRt 4  1:570 0:178  6:187  0:536 2:746  0:656
(2:707) (2:675) (2:925) (2:963) (3:018) (1:010)
STAYt  6:901  1:282  8:726  6:850 0:861 0:851
(2:644) (3:515) (4:755) (2:703) (4:817) (1:947)
STAYt 1  4:090  2:935  0:773  4:995  4:034  2:382
(2:476) (2:722) (4:787) (2:477) (2:907) (1:303)
STAYt 2 8:247 9:247 2:549 9:660 11:70 4:786
(2:997) (3:815) (4:205) (3:146) (4:358) (1:469)
STAYt 3  1:170  3:383  9:165 0:877  1:578  2:392
(2:833) (3:234) (4:781) (3:129) (3:683) (0:791)
STAYt 4  7:697  9:207 9:888  11:88  14:92  5:318
(3:364) (4:471) (4:416) (3:733) (5:232) (2:528)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted: 3:98 7:04 4:34 3:77 8:90  3:11
(2:78) (3:24) (3:06) (3:03) (3:67) (1:50)
POPGR, discounted (Bn): 4:62 9:43 2:59 4:92 13:1  3:77
(4:16) (4:89) (4:67) (4:52) (5:71) (2:14)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  11:6  7:56  6:23  13:2  7:97  4:46
(3:68) (3:83) (4:33) (3:71) (4:04) (2:28)
STAY, discounted (B):  12:6  9:00  5:47  14:6  10:0  5:42
(3:95) (4:19) (4:56) (3:97) (4:42) (2:65)
Table 10: Continued on the next page
6
0(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP EQUIP& LAND CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG 0:0411  0:461 0:611  0:176  0:856  0:601
(1:017) (0:994) (1:189) (1:082) (1:059) (0:696)
STATEINC 0:0409 0:0416 0:0217 0:0458 0:0506 0:0203
(0:0114) (0:0125) (0:0116) (0:0118) (0:0136) (0:00777)
EDU 0:266 0:299 0:809 0:0983 0:0574 0:904
(0:540) (0:595) (0:540) (0:571) (0:654) (0:273)
URBAN 0:162 0:568 0:200 0:186 0:740  0:376
(0:303) (0:311) (0:263) (0:324) (0:324) (0:215)
DENSITY  0:499  0:661  0:501  0:503  0:720 0:0418
(0:206) (0:212) (0:252) (0:216) (0:230) (0:152)
OVER65 2:105  0:660 0:683 2:450  0:955  1:761
(1:614) (1:888) (1:872) (1:696) (2:143) (1:247)
UNDER25 4:368 3:004 3:231 4:571 2:811 0:698
(1:279) (1:433) (1:380) (1:327) (1:568) (0:968)
HOMEOWN  0:369  0:489 0:336  0:555  0:758  0:650
(0:632) (0:626) (0:744) (0:650) (0:666) (0:438)
LIB 0:0123 0:00717  0:00215 0:0151 0:000610 0:00739
(0:0374) (0:0361) (0:0345) (0:0402) (0:0418) (0:0198)
SIZE 1:006 2:036 1:811 0:691 2:050 1:961
(1:819) (2:063) (2:111) (1:928) (2:317) (1:012)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
R-squared 0.692 0.696 0.601 0.666 0.669 0.624
Table 10: Robustness to including local spending: Regression of the sum of state and local
spending on population growth and the fraction of stayers and their lags (at the state level), in-
cluding controls. Year dummies are included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
6
1(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt 4:714 10:31 14:79 5:487 3:338 8:252 9:488
(4:753) (6:614) (19:31) (4:242) (5:268) (8:946) (2:409)
POPGRt 1 7:144 9:054 12:99 6:439 6:730 10:00 3:158
(2:796) (3:886) (8:316) (4:706) (3:129) (5:181) (1:365)
POPGRt 2  0:594  1:965 9:213  2:542  0:876  2:224 1:311
(2:919) (4:018) (9:036) (3:091) (3:297) (5:334) (0:913)
POPGRt 3 1:700  0:0200 2:013 3:973 1:416  0:172  2:419
(1:923) (4:377) (9:013) (2:720) (2:262) (5:745) (1:269)
POPGRt 4  12:60  14:13  5:171  7:674  13:94  17:53  6:617
(4:487) (5:912) (12:66) (4:186) (5:147) (7:051) (2:359)
STAYt  13:65  0:734  6:146  5:942  14:49  0:0914 2:097
(5:663) (6:356) (23:89) (7:473) (6:125) (7:343) (3:865)
STAYt 1  10:07  8:123  9:976  7:665  11:96  10:27 1:030
(4:714) (6:187) (16:04) (5:727) (5:119) (7:201) (3:040)
STAYt 2 5:675  4:575 30:85 4:595 4:906  9:533 2:975
(6:921) (9:508) (17:23) (6:416) (7:619) (11:91) (2:481)
STAYt 3  0:871  3:976  12:82  6:681  0:169 0:735  1:788
(8:617) (10:78) (18:02) (7:542) (9:309) (14:05) (2:362)
STAYt 4  3:350 2:169  1:394 0:925  2:375 1:997  13:91
(6:293) (12:77) (19:85) (7:712) (6:650) (16:78) (4:732)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted: 0:361 3:25 33:8 5:68  3:33  1:67 4:92
(9:19) (12:6) (31:5) (6:77) (10:5) (16:4) (5:53)
POPGR, discounted (Bn):  6:82  6:00 35:8 2:38  11:7  13:3  0:0673
(12:0) (17:1) (41:5) (8:52) (13:7) (21:7) (7:75)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  22:3  15:2 0:509  14:8  24:1  17:2  9:60
(3:56) (4:35) (12:2) (3:10) (3:92) (5:38) (3:10)
STAY, discounted (B):  22:9  16:1 0:804  15:4  24:6  18:0  12:1
(3:99) (5:28) (12:6) (3:13) (4:31) (6:27) (3:90)
Table 11: Continued on the next page
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2(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG  1:903  4:243  1:315  2:943  1:484  4:711  3:004
(1:226) (1:697) (2:932) (1:638) (1:227) (1:843) (0:771)
STATEINC 0:0257 0:0285 0:0173 0:0308 0:0259 0:0278 0:00822
(0:0124) (0:0150) (0:0276) (0:0123) (0:0134) (0:0175) (0:00989)
EDU  0:0381 0:350  0:433 0:0426  0:105 0:506 0:925
(0:706) (0:802) (1:568) (0:692) (0:789) (1:023) (0:363)
URBAN  0:606  0:180  0:320  0:603  0:593 0:0370  0:764
(0:335) (0:405) (0:827) (0:328) (0:365) (0:495) (0:294)
DENSITY 0:212 0:227 0:766  0:192 0:266 0:372 0:198
(0:166) (0:322) (0:647) (0:271) (0:174) (0:401) (0:222)
OVER65 2:347  4:870  1:410 1:584 2:319  8:873  4:008
(1:941) (2:928) (7:112) (1:940) (2:007) (3:804) (1:865)
UNDER25 5:183 4:172  0:311 6:300 5:308 2:982 0:164
(1:585) (2:338) (5:743) (1:813) (1:645) (2:876) (1:379)
HOMEOWN  1:074  2:199  1:032  0:954  1:135  2:433  1:001
(0:751) (0:948) (2:034) (0:946) (0:754) (1:048) (0:511)
LIB 0:0222 0:0671  0:0878 0:00917 0:0292 0:0946 0:0673
(0:0378) (0:0446) (0:0979) (0:0391) (0:0410) (0:0508) (0:0200)
SIZE  1:778  1:626  2:132  1:860  2:270  0:820  0:184
(1:830) (2:374) (5:953) (1:887) (1:905) (2:675) (1:589)
Table 11: Continued on the next page
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3(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
NETMIGt  6:128  13:59  9:778  6:266  6:239  13:81  14:78
(6:567) (10:34) (25:90) (6:950) (6:944) (12:47) (2:765)
NETMIGt 1  0:271  1:313  8:973 4:390 0:454  1:700  3:584
(4:026) (5:611) (8:947) (4:002) (4:470) (7:134) (2:056)
NETMIGt 2  3:979 6:103  16:07  0:884  4:136 8:636  0:855
(5:642) (7:373) (12:66) (4:626) (6:131) (9:162) (1:157)
NETMIGt 3 2:377 2:597  0:364 1:088 2:602 3:025 0:954
(5:303) (7:068) (15:73) (4:739) (5:419) (8:531) (2:243)
NETMIGt 4 6:467 5:534 19:54  4:928 7:352 9:664 8:793
(4:156) (7:455) (14:19) (6:661) (4:543) (10:19) (2:523)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sum of coecients on net migration:
NETMIG, undiscounted:  1:53  0:674  15:7  6:60 0:0326 5:82  9:47
(11:2) (15:8) (36:0) (9:66) (12:1) (19:9) (5:64)
Observations 1,400 1,400 1,398 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
R-squared 0.637 0.577 0.109 0.540 0.611 0.534 0.760
Table 11: Robustness to controlling for net migration: Regression of spending on population
growth, the fraction of stayers, net migration, and their lags, including controls. Year dummies are
included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated at the 1%
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
6
4(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt  0:312  2:684 6:906 0:809  1:176  4:905  0:454
(2:780) (3:825) (9:621) (4:032) (2:898) (4:141) (1:633)
POPGRt 1 5:720 10:66 4:874 7:252 5:391 12:24 0:675
(2:039) (3:397) (8:451) (3:497) (2:163) (3:641) (0:706)
POPGRt 2  3:005 1:780  4:695  1:778  3:226 3:175  0:150
(1:494) (2:665) (7:179) (2:706) (1:837) (3:784) (0:603)
POPGRt 3 1:803 3:449 7:590 4:197 0:957 3:914  0:625
(1:999) (2:953) (5:860) (2:439) (2:275) (4:478) (0:646)
POPGRt 4  5:806  10:44 7:749  10:18  6:459  11:45  0:471
(3:254) (5:105) (10:09) (3:027) (3:614) (6:763) (1:226)
STAYt  19:84  3:134  2:007  14:02  22:97  3:402  8:195
(5:026) (7:261) (25:04) (7:246) (5:837) (10:39) (3:672)
STAYt 1  9:802  18:77  15:75 6:319  12:28  27:72 0:941
(4:086) (5:455) (15:93) (5:905) (5:037) (7:853) (2:180)
STAYt 2 2:510  1:606 17:92 1:514 1:601  5:033 1:148
(3:364) (5:593) (13:69) (6:829) (3:564) (9:055) (1:409)
STAYt 3 2:848  2:167  16:27  7:594 4:685 4:850  1:055
(4:419) (9:504) (16:12) (7:773) (5:076) (13:61) (1:360)
STAYt 4 5:046 18:59 30:13 2:882 6:784 22:40 3:062
(6:487) (9:884) (24:14) (7:508) (7:157) (12:74) (2:891)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted:  1:60 2:77 22:4 0:300  4:51 2:97  1:02
(3:30) (4:14) (9:22) (3:01) (3:79) (5:64) (1:94)
POPGR, discounted (Bn):  4:90  0:816 30:9  4:31  8:80  0:443  1:61
(5:19) (6:84) (14:9) (4:93) (5:99) (9:20) (2:75)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  19:2  7:09 14:0  10:9  22:2  8:90  4:10
(4:67) (4:96) (10:6) (3:34) (5:08) (7:03) (2:27)
STAY, discounted (B):  18:1  4:95 18:2  11:0  20:7  5:81  3:55
(5:36) (5:35) (11:5) (3:36) (5:81) (7:78) (2:50)
Table 12: Continued on the next page
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5(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG  1:121  2:260 2:676  2:076  0:767  2:243  2:952
(1:508) (2:110) (3:361) (2:052) (1:456) (2:181) (0:757)
STATEINC 0:0219 0:0135 0:0132 0:0259 0:0244 0:0125  0:00521
(0:0136) (0:0142) (0:0273) (0:0133) (0:0151) (0:0172) (0:00903)
EDU  0:151 0:449  0:261  0:00969  0:312 0:486 1:267
(0:637) (0:698) (1:560) (0:647) (0:720) (0:872) (0:354)
URBAN  0:421  0:0590  0:338  0:548  0:394 0:114  0:366
(0:364) (0:387) (0:865) (0:372) (0:394) (0:448) (0:266)
DENSITY 0:312 0:619 1:403  0:0108 0:334 0:852 0:197
(0:239) (0:382) (0:734) (0:347) (0:236) (0:463) (0:216)
OVER65 3:058  3:388 3:704 2:549 2:905  7:429  2:610
(1:912) (2:677) (5:885) (1:721) (2:092) (3:669) (1:297)
UNDER25 5:035 3:478 0:670 7:086 5:135 1:711  0:0800
(1:507) (1:762) (4:922) (1:689) (1:648) (2:431) (1:103)
HOMEOWN  0:835  1:317 0:293  0:802  0:912  1:131  0:801
(0:806) (1:221) (2:008) (1:150) (0:763) (1:298) (0:431)
LIB 0:0139 0:0257  0:191  0:00493 0:0257 0:0525 0:0614
(0:0389) (0:0408) (0:102) (0:0366) (0:0428) (0:0515) (0:0168)
SIZE  2:759  2:229  3:788  2:162  3:337  1:336  0:547
(1:950) (2:232) (5:387) (1:723) (2:100) (2:678) (1:685)
POLCOMP  0:0186  0:206  0:0451 0:588  0:0446  0:474  0:148
(0:233) (0:318) (0:933) (0:295) (0:256) (0:406) (0:167)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,198 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
R-squared 0.539 0.446 0.136 0.481 0.513 0.401 0.755
Table 12: Robustness to controlling for political competition: Regression of spending on
population growth and the fraction of stayers and their lags, including controls. The measure of
political competition from Besley, Persson, and Sturm [11] is included among the controls. Year
dummies are included, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. Signicance is indicated
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
6
6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
POPGRt 2:906 4:474 12:32 2:251 1:881 3:643 2:048
(1:786) (2:690) (7:366) (2:708) (2:096) (3:184) (0:471)
POPGRt 1 4:852 8:399 4:638 7:088 4:847 9:820  0:321
(1:253) (2:552) (6:601) (2:961) (1:453) (2:840) (0:397)
POPGRt 2  2:161 0:329  0:641  2:284  2:308 1:211 0:525
(1:150) (2:335) (7:642) (2:356) (1:385) (3:409) (0:745)
POPGRt 3 3:941 3:958 4:915 3:882 3:823 5:008  0:0408
(1:508) (2:684) (4:645) (2:143) (1:713) (3:817) (0:416)
POPGRt 4  3:329  7:425 1:442  6:912  2:991  7:129 1:228
(2:018) (3:079) (6:999) (1:964) (2:213) (4:484) (0:669)
STAYt  9:223  6:225  12:74  2:675  10:01  7:263  3:721
(3:169) (4:362) (17:36) (4:903) (3:483) (5:817) (1:541)
STAYt 1  6:618  11:40  9:924  2:457  7:899  15:11  1:561
(2:393) (5:114) (11:97) (5:592) (2:878) (6:793) (1:032)
STAYt 2 1:935  3:667 12:15 5:509 0:833  8:870  0:431
(2:590) (4:767) (11:30) (5:705) (3:055) (7:864) (1:289)
STAYt 3  1:544  4:516  12:06  5:169  1:278  1:082  1:236
(4:006) (7:809) (12:02) (6:781) (4:520) (10:99) (0:899)
STAYt 4 1:477 8:185 29:07 1:532 0:912 9:054  2:482
(4:581) (6:592) (17:95) (5:085) (5:012) (8:566) (1:658)
Sums of coecients:
POPGR, undiscounted: 6:21 9:73 22:7 4:02 5:25 12:6 3:44
(2:49) (4:05) (10:6) (3:10) (2:86) (6:22) (1:28)
POPGR, discounted (Bn): 5:84 7:75 26:6 1:38 5:01 11:8 4:40
(3:48) (5:62) (15:8) (4:58) (3:80) (8:57) (1:86)
STAY, undiscounted (B
):  14:0  17:6 6:49  3:26  17:4  23:3  9:43
(4:84) (5:98) (20:9) (4:48) (5:35) (7:73) (2:54)
STAY, discounted (B):  14:0  17:5 10:8  3:30  17:7  23:2  10:1
(5:25) (6:28) (23:0) (4:91) (5:76) (8:01) (2:82)
Table 13: Continued on the next page
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7(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES TOTCAP NHCAP LAND EQUIP CONSTR NHCONSTR CURRENT
INTMIG 2:885  0:854 3:064 0:807 3:261 0:456 0:709
(1:759) (2:236) (6:354) (1:972) (1:890) (3:040) (0:743)
STATEINC 0:0350 0:0569  0:00836 0:0265 0:0361 0:0661 0:00159
(0:0115) (0:0133) (0:0603) (0:0112) (0:0131) (0:0178) (0:00557)
EDU  0:233 0:176 5:852  0:956  0:645  0:455 0:217
(0:824) (0:868) (3:172) (0:795) (0:912) (1:294) (0:353)
URBAN  0:267 0:266 1:060  0:441  0:786 0:650 0:0370
(0:566) (0:811) (2:920) (0:616) (0:777) (1:236) (0:236)
DENSITY  1:232  3:673 10:28 1:851  2:013  7:320  0:812
(1:358) (1:730) (4:916) (1:431) (1:488) (2:546) (0:701)
OVER65 1:702 1:177  10:15 2:251 0:871  1:569 0:000207
(3:222) (4:106) (13:38) (2:911) (3:856) (4:873) (1:369)
UNDER25 0:461 0:834 1:230 2:147  1:193  1:185  0:337
(2:221) (2:825) (8:522) (2:228) (2:756) (4:067) (1:060)
HOMEOWN  0:315  0:646  0:108  0:122  0:341  0:520  0:286
(0:602) (0:753) (2:076) (0:667) (0:696) (1:061) (0:228)
LIB  0:0447  0:0600  0:123 0:00876  0:0388  0:0695  0:0150
(0:0224) (0:0320) (0:114) (0:0275) (0:0272) (0:0436) (0:00931)
SIZE 1:127 8:005 25:63  22:99 1:883 13:04 6:960
(7:868) (8:013) (33:64) (11:50) (8:074) (10:55) (4:034)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,400 1,400 1,398 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400
R-squared 0.839 0.800 0.417 0.741 0.814 0.747 0.963
Table 13: Robustness to including state xed eects: Regression of spending on population
growth and the fraction of stayers and their lags, including controls. State and year dummies are
included. Signicance is indicated at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
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